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THE UNBEARABLE LIGHTNESS OF MARRIAGE IN THE
ABORTION DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT: ALTERED
STATES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
William Van Alstyne*
INTRODUCTION
"Marriage" is a term that appears in the most ordinary dictionary,' but not in the
Constitution or in the Bill of Rights.2 So, in contrast with the Constitution's treatment
of "the freedom of speech," or the "[freedom] of the press,"3 no provision addresses
or establishes "the freedom to marry," or "the right to have a family," or even the right
"to have children within marriage." Indeed, for that matter, there are no provisions dis-
tinguishing any "rights" for those who do marry from any rights of those who do not.
* Lee Professor of Constitutional Law, Marshall-Wythe Law School, College ofWilliam
& Mary; Perkins Professor of Law (emeritus), Duke University. (This brief essay is offered
partly by way of oblique critical comment on a recent article by Jack Balkin, in his reliance on
the Equal Protection Clause to account for the Supreme Court's abortion decisions-an account
that I think is inadvertently more paradoxical than persuasive, in Jack Balkin, Abortion and
Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 319-28 (2007).)
' See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 801 (William
Morris ed., 1st ed. 1970) ("marriage... n. 1. a. The state of being husband and wife; wedlock.
b. The legal union of a man and woman as husband and wife.... [Middle English mariage,
from Old French, from marier, to MARRY.]"). But see also a third definition, as given by the
same source-marriage defined more loosely as "[a]ny close union" (e.g. a "marriage of
minds") or even "a union of inanimate objects (as music and drama in opera)." Id.
2 In contrast, it does appear expressly in some other national constitutions. See, for ex-
ample, the Constitution (the "Basic Law') of Germany, GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 6(1) (F.R.G.)
[hereinafter Basic Law] ("Marriage and the family shall enjoy the special protection of the
state."). See also Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights,
art. 17, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force July 18,
1978) ('The right of men and women.., to marry and to raise a family shall be recognized ....
The States Parties shall take appropriate steps to ensure the equality of rights... during mar-
riage ...."); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A(XXI),
art. 23, U.N. GAOR, 21st sess., supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) 999 U.N.T.S.
171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) ("1. The family is the natural and fundamental group
unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State. 2. The right of men and
women.., to marry and to found a family shall be recognized."); Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 16, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st. plen. mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/8 10 (Dec. 12, 1948) ("Men and women.. . have the right to marry and to found a family.
They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.").
3 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press .... ").
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And since even the very word "marriage" does not appear in the Constitution, neither
is it given any definitional boundaries constraining either Congress or the states.4
Even so, over the course of two centuries ofjudicial review, the Supreme Court
has considered the status of marriage in many decisions testing the permissible scope
of state and federal laws that deal with marriage.5 On the whole, moreover, at least
until quite recently, these decisions have treated marriage as a special relationship per-
haps more vital and more foundational within our constitutional culture than nearly
any other.6 More than a century ago, for example, the Supreme Court described the
centrality of marriage in society in the following way: "Upon [the institution of
marriage] society may be said to be built, and out of its fruits spring social relations
and social obligations and duties, with which government is necessarily required to
deal."7 And so, quite naturally, the institution of marriage, and its regulation, have
been recurring subjects of constitutional review.
The principal sources of Supreme Court decisions strongly sheltering rights within
marriage have been the "due process of law" clauses in the Constitution The earlier
4 Note that the definition of marriage, see THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note 1, acknowledges a usage of "marriage" as a mere "union of
inanimate objects (as music and drama in opera)." May it therefore follow that a legislature
might treat marriage as just such a relationship, i.e., as a relationship merely between "inanimate
objects"? The idea seems startling and even preposterous, so far removed is it from one's
natural intuitions on what marriage between two people must surely mean. (Still, in certain
respects, as we shall see, it is arguable that the modem treatment of marriage sometimes seems
to amount to little more than this .... )
See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 6, 7, 12, 13, and 19.
6 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) ("Marriage is one of the 'basic civil
rights of man' fundamental to our very existence and survival.").
7 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165 (1878). The question before the Court in
Reynolds was whether polygamous marriage (one husband and several wives) must be accepted
by law as "marriage" (rather than disallowed as a form of criminal bigamy or criminal co-
habitation), for persons claiming protection under the Free Exercise of Religion Clause in the
First Amendment. The Court's answer was "no." See id. The Court has held that a free exercise
claim may nonetheless provide some degree of family exemption from otherwise controlling
state statutes (e.g., mandatory enrollment of one's children in some accredited school). See,
e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (permitting withdrawal of Amish children
from any further accredited schooling at the eighth grade); cf Employment Div. of Or. Dep't
of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,881 (1990) (re-characterizing Yoder as also a family-
liberty-parental rights due process case).
8 See U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV. The use of the Due Process Clauses (protecting
life, liberty, and property) as a source of substantive limits on state power traces its lineage
in legal history to chapter 39 of the Magna Carta, at Runnymede, in 1215: "No free man shall
be... stripped of his rights or possessions.., except by the lawful judgement of his equals or
by the law of the land." The latter phrase ("the law of the land") was accepted into American
practice to mean laws consistent with right and with reason; i.e., not arbitrary in the treatment
of personal liberty. See Edward S. Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the
Civil War, 24 HARv. L. REv. 366 (1911); Edward S. Corwin, The 'Higher Law'Background
ofAmerican Constitutional Law, 42 HARv. L. REv. 149 (1928).
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of these identically-framed clauses appears in the Fifth Amendment of the Bill of
Rights,9 but this clause is binding only on Congress and not on the states."0 The other,
enacted in 1868, appears in the Fourteenth Amendment and expressly does bind the
states." Together, these clauses have been understood to limit the national govern-
ment and the state governments from enacting highly intrusive laws infringing on
private liberty within marriage. 2 They have likewise been applied to provide for the
equal protection of husbands and wives within marriage.13 For the greater part of
9 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law .... ").
'0 Note that, unlike the First Amendment, the Fifth Amendment has no language expressly
confining its application only to acts of Congress. See U.S. Const. amend. V. Nevertheless, it
was widely understood solely to limit the national government, and to leave the state govern-
ments to be limited only in such manner, and according to such restrictions, as their own
respective state constitutions might provide. The Supreme Court accepted this understanding
of the Fifth Amendment. Accordingly, it held the amendment to have no applicability to the
states. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
1" U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("No State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.. . ."). In the aftermath of the Civil War (1860-1865),
in the course of proposing new constitutional limits on the states, Congress was no longer
willing to trust the states not to "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law," as was previously the case under the Fifth Amendment. Accordingly, the
Thirty-ninth Congress (the Reconstruction Congress of 1866) proposed to extend the Fifth
Amendment provision in a new form to make it equally controlling in every state; as the
national government was not empowered to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law (but, rather, had at all times since 1791 been forbidden to do so),
so too, the states were likewise thereafter to be subject to the same restraint. In brief, with the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, the anomaly of exempting state legisla-
tures from due process standards previously applicable only to Congress came to an end. See
generally KRIs E. PALMER, CONSTrrUTIONAL AMENDMENTS: 1789 TO THE PRESENT 328-35
(2000) (describing the history of the Fourteenth Amendment).
12 No doubt the single strongest modem example is Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965). The Court held that consensual expressions of sexual intimacy within marriage
are generally reserved from state authority by the Due Process Clause. In Griswold, moreover,
the Court expressly distinguished "marital privacy," stressing the special commitment reflected
within marriage and describing marriage as a "bilateral loyalty," a relationship traditionally
sheltered and protected by the law. Id. at 486. For still additional emphases, see id, at 486
(Goldberg, J., concurring, joined by Warren, J., and Brennan, J.); id at 495 (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) (speaking ofthe "private realm offamily life" and of"husband and wife's marital
relations" (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551-52 (1961))); id. at 503 (White, J.,
concurring) (emphasizing marital privacy). See also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110,
124 (1989) (where the Court again stated that "our traditions have protected the marital
family"); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371 (1971); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 539 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); and
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
13 See, e.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420
U.S. 636 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). These cases all involve dis-
parities in treatment under federal law of spousal benefits received by husbands and by wives
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the twentieth century, the pattern of judicial decisions of both kinds-the special
protection of marriage and of equality of rights within marriage-tended to be of a
common piece. Overall, they strongly sheltered marriage and the mutual interests of
married persons in each other and in the new livesjoining them through their children,
born of that union, conceived within that special union of mutual commitment to one
another. A single case decided nearly ninety years ago, affords a suitable example
to illustrate the point. 4
Following World War I, several states enacted laws forbidding any language
instruction other than English to be permitted in any school to any child prior to the
eighth grade. 5 Ostensibly, these laws were enacted to ensure that the children of first
or second generation immigrant families would become fluent in English. 6 Rather
than taking care merely to insure adequate instruction in English to serve that end,
however, these laws outlawing any non-English language classes, whether in private
schools or in public schools, were far more sweeping. 7 That is, they forbade any
language instruction in any other language at all until a child was in the eighth grade
regardless of the degree of English literacy a child might already have or, indeed,
be able to demonstrate according to such tests, written or oral, as the state might re-
quire. The effect of these laws was particularly harsh on large numbers of immi-
grant families."8 They effectively deprived these families (and, indeed, many other
families) of any lawful means whatever to enable their own children even to receive
any instruction in any school of the language spoken by their parents at home.
The Supreme Court held this restriction to be a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause in Meyer v. Nebraska.9 The Court's opinion
struck down as inconsistent with the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause requirements of
equality of treatment of spouses within marriage. In cases arising under state laws rather than
under federal laws, the Court has tended more often to rely on the Equal Protection Clause-
rather than the Due Process Clause-to provide equality of treatment of spouses within mar-
riage. See, e.g., Off v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (one-way alimony rights held invalid as
denying equal protection within marriage); see also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978)
(state law conditioning ability to marry on showing that child support obligations have been
met held to violate the Equal Protection Clause); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (state
law restrictions on interracial marriage held void pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment).
14 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
15 See Susan G. Lawrence, Substantive Due Process and Parental Rights: From Meyer
v. Nebraska to Troxel v. Granville, 8 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 71, 73-74 (2006).
16 One says "ostensibly," advisedly (i.e., there was considerable evidence in the back-
ground strongly suggesting that these laws were enacted partly from a lingering anti-German
animus following World War I). See id.
'" See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 397 (quoting the language of the statute at issue); Lawrence,
supra note 15, at 73-75.
18 See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 397-402.
'9 See id. at 399-401; see also Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927) (same case
arising under federal statute applicable to the federal territory of Hawaii; same result on Fifth
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treated as "fundamental '2° the "freedom... to marry," and the right to "bring up
children."'" Protecting the interests of parents in the education of their own children
meant that the state could not forbid them from having their children learn their own
language as well as English, at least in schools with teachers willing to provide such
instruction.22 The opinion for the Court pointedly contrasted Plato's visionary
Republic in which, as the Court observed: "no parent [was] to know his own child,
nor any child his parent," but all were, instead, to be impersonally commingled and,
after suitable training, assigned according to some designated social utility and role.23
While acknowledging that such forms of social organization had been commended
by writers of great capacity (e.g., by Plato himself as well as many others), the Court
simply observed that their premises-their assumptions respecting a well-ordered
state-were "wholly different from those upon which our institutions rest."'24 To be
sure, the state laws at issue did not seek literally to enact Plato's vision, literally sepa-
rating children from their parents soon after birth, but they were cut from the same
alienating principles of state power. The restrictive state laws were struck down on
due process grounds.25 The enduring pertinence of Meyer and of an impressive num-
ber of subsequent decisions,26 lay in their treatment of family aspirations, of mutually
shared interests in children within marriage, and in the protection of the family from
being undermined by the state.
I.
In more recent decades, however, there has been a marked shift in respect to
marriage, both institutionally, as well as in decisions of the Court. In certain salient
respects, what it once was it no longer is.27 Formerly, the distinctions of marriage as
a special estate were indeed such that in some measure society itself could be said
virtually to be "built upon it," because of how much it mattered. More recently,
however, the emphasis has shifted to something far more pale and different in kind:
to marriage substantially diminished and in some measure constitutionally thinned
or reduced.
In 1972, the Supreme Court itself broke the boundary separating intimacy within
marriage from intimacy outside in its startling decision in the case of Eisenstadt v.
Amendment due process grounds); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Bartels
v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923) (same issue, same result).
20 See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401.
21 Id. at 399.
22 Id. at 400.
23 Id. at 401-02.
24 Id. at 402.
25 Id. at 399.
26 See cases cited supra notes 12, 13, & 19.
27 For a helpful review, see Mary Ann Glendon, Marriage and the State: The Withering
Away of Marriage, 62 VA. L. REv. 663 (1976). See also infra text accompanying notes 46-58.
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Baird.28 The Eisenstadt decision was most significant because the Court decided
it on equal protection, rather than on due process, grounds.29 It held that since the
law in question did not forbid retail sale of contraceptive devices for use by married
couples, it therefore could not forbid such sales to unmarried persons-that is, it
was unsustainable insofar as the law drew a distinction between those who were
married and those who were not.3"
In a single stroke, the Court turned inside out the very distinction relied upon
in its earlier decisions preceding Eisenstadt, most emphatically in Griswold v.
Connecticut.3 Whereas in Griswold (and in all previous cases sheltering marriage),
it was precisely because of the mutual decision to share their lives, their private inti-
macy, and their commitments respecting children in marriage that provided the con-
stitutional basis for acknowledging a qualified zone of "marital privacy," insulated
from being put under stress by the state, quite breathtakingly, in Eisenstadt, Justice
Brennan summarily dismissed all prior emphases on the institution of marriage as
distinctive per se.32 In Eisenstadt, the Court's constitutional equal protection ruling
was that a state could not make it a criminal offense to market contraceptive devices
to single persons while exempting sales of such devices to married couples.33 The
syllogism was extreme. It ran in the following absurdist form: A. The State may
not forbid married couples from securing professional assistance and access to devices
helpful to them to forestall unwanted risks of pregnancy incidental to their shared
desire for sexual intimacy within their marriage. B. Since the State does not forbid
married couples from the use of such devices, neither may it do so for those who
have made no commitment to marriage. "A." is the substantive due process "marital
privacy" proposition in Griswold. "B." is the equal protection holding of Eisenstadt.
In Eisenstadt, the Court "reasoned" that because of A., therefore (also) B. In doing
so, it effaced the very basis on which its decision in Griswold and every preceding
related decision of a like sort had rested, from Meyer v. Nebraska34 to the date of
Eisenstadt itself.35 In dicta, Eisenstadt v. Baird also provisionally effaced marriage
as providing any significant distinction in measuring "unwarranted... intrusion[s]"
into such closely associated related matters as decisions "whether to bear or beget a
28 See 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding that the right of access to contraceptive devices of
unmarried persons is equal to those within marriage).
29 See id. at 446-55.
30 See id. at 452-55.
"' 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
32 See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 447.
33 See id at 448-50.
14 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
35 For clear statements on the utter anomaly of the Court's "analysis" in Eisenstadt v.
Baird, see H. JEFFERSON POwELL, THE MORAL TRADrION OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM:
A THEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION (1993), and Michael Sandel, MoralArgumentandLiberal
Toleration: Abortion and Homosexuality, 77 CAL. L. REV. 521, 526-28 (1989).
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child."36 Following Eisenstadt, one was left to wonder what this might mean with its
quite casual suggestion that there is little that may matter about marriage after all.
It did not take long to find out. And, indeed, one may quickly see the difference
this altered view may make in affecting one's own thinking, simply by tracing the
aftermath of the way in which, beginning with Eisenstadt and carrying into the present
time, marriage has been so far marginalized by the Supreme Court to the point that it
now holds the view that one who has conceived a child in marriage with his wife has
no more standing to claim an interest in the well-being of the child thus conceived
than the most casual male acquaintance with whom she may have had an equally
casual one night affair (namely, virtually none at all). It requires no great skill to
illustrate the point in just the following way.
II.
First, consider the constitutionality of a state statute that does attach a meaningful
distinction to "marriage," i.e., a provision merely making clear that within marriage,
one may have a compelling concern in the safe birth of one's own child, even as re-
flected in the following specific protective act:
37
Minn. Civ. Code Sec. 241: Absent any plausible medical justifica-
tion, no physician shall undertake any act to destroy any gestating
child willingly conceived within marriage and wanted as the lawful
child by either parent willing to provide it with appropriate support.
How might an opinion be framed reviewing this law (as it might be tested against
some kind of remarkable claim that the act should be held to offend the Due Process
Clause of the Constitution)?38 One may not be quite certain, of course, but certainly
36 Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
" The statutes and draft opinions presented in this section were created by the author for
illustrative purposes.
38 It presumably would be a due process claim (rather than, say, an equal protection claim)
an objecting married woman would seek to assert. For, indeed, with whom would an objecting
married woman seek to be comparing herself insofar as she put her complaint on "equal"
protection (rather than due process) grounds? With an unmarried woman? Indeed, in fact,
quite ironically, if there were to be some basis for a viable equal protection claim as matters
currently stand, that claim would more compellingly belong to the bereft father whose "rights"
in the well-being of his child conceived within marriage are zero as against those of the mother
who may either carry it to term or terminate the gestating child for whatever reason is satis-
factory to herself irrespective of her husband's feelings and irrespective of any representations
or promises she made when they married and conceived the child by mutual choice. See dis-
cussion infra, the better to understand this point. For prior Supreme Court cases applying the
Equal Protection Clause on behalf of husbands as well as wives within marriage, see cases
cited in supra note 13.
2009]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
the following opinion would have been an unexceptional response drawing from the
Supreme Court's cases at least as far back as Meyer v. Nebraska, and consistent with
Griswold v. Connecticut itself:
It is startling to think there may be any substantial constitu-
tional question raised by this statute. We do not think that there
is. That marriage, the most personal and sheltered estate known
to the law, should come accompanied by no legal recognition of
mutually protected parenting interests in a child willingly con-
ceived within that marriage" might itself more reasonably be
thought to raise the more substantial constitutional question than
this modestly protective law. Indeed, it is more likely that the
obverse of this law, rather than this law, would present the more
substantial constitutional question. For insofar as a state law would
presume to license any willing physician to proceed with a proce-
dure calculated to kill and destroy (even) a four-month child in
gestation, willingly conceived within marriage, without the least
regard for its place in the life and the feelings of its lawful father
as well as of its mother, could itself more plausibly raise the more
substantial question for this Court. It would be hard to say that so
harsh a law would meet the common understanding of due pro-
cess, or of equal protection as reflected in our various decisions
affecting matters such as this. Within marriage a gestating child,
willingly conceived within that marriage, surely need not-and
perhaps, indeed, may not-be regarded by law as but one person's
"separate property," summarily to be disposed of with any will-
ing physician's particularized skill. Not since the terrible days of
Dred Scott v. Sandford" has this Court taken so "detached" a
view of what constitutes protected interests in human lives.
It is now more than four decades since Justice Douglas
acknowledged for this Court, in Griswoldv. Connecticut, in speak-
ing of marriage, that marriage is an association that promotes a way
of life, a union freely entered into to express a bilateral loyalty,
neither more nor less, a special estate.4 Nearly a half-century
3 [Note by the Court.] Which is all that this statute purports to reach. We express no
opinion respecting the validity of any law purporting to do anything more. Specifically, this
act reaches no claim by anyone outside of the marriage. Equally, it makes no claim other than
in respect to children conceived within marriage "willingly," i.e., by mutual will of both
parties, husband and wife together, neither more nor less.
4 [Note by the Court.] 60 U.S. 393 (1857) (the "slave decision" by Chief Justice Roger
Taney of this Court).
' Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
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earlier, in Meyer v. Nebraska, we had noted that "[w]hile this court
has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaran-
teed [by the Fourteenth Amendment]... [w]ithout doubt, it de-
notes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also.., the
right... to many, establish a home and bring up children....,42
The value of human life in gestation may be subject to much
debate and differences of opinion.43 Yet, we think it is surely not
so worthless as always to be rendered discardable at unilateral
will. And we find no ground to invalidate a law that merely pro-
vides that absent any plausible medical necessity,' no physician
shall undertake any act to destroy any child in gestation when it
is a child willingly conceived within marriage and sufficiently
valued by at least one of its parents (even if not, alas, by both)
who will cherish and stand ready to provide it all necessary sup-
port, if it is merely allowed to be born. Indeed, we find it diffi-
cult to grasp an argument grounded in the Constitution sufficient
to maintain the opposite conclusion-that a law of this merely
minimally protective sort, enabling one with whom a child was
willingly conceived within marriage, to protect the very life of
that gestating child from dismemberment and premature death
for reasons exclusively satisfactory to the person who may now
desire to unburden herself of permitting it merely to be born, is
somehow to be regarded as at odds with some clause, or some
42 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
43 [Note by the Court.] We expressly acknowledged as much in Roe v. Wade, as we
likewise acknowledged that it was not for the judiciary to take upon itself so to resolve the
matter as such, i.e., by presuming to dismiss some views as "right" and others "wrong." See
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973) ("We need not resolve the difficult question of when
[meaningful] life begins. When those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, phi-
losophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the
development of man's knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer.")
(emphasis added). Admittedly, and perhaps to some troubling degree inconsistently, having
so expressly declared, it is true that in Roe itself, a majority of this Court nevertheless did
presume to hold that no view of the matter would be respected by this Court to justify any law,
even one imperative to secure that human life from destruction, if it significantly interfered
with (or substantially burdened) a woman's decision that it was, in her own view, not a life
worthy enough of being permitted to live as against her "choice" not to permit it to live even
until it might be safely delivered (as, say, in the sixth or seventh month at best). See id. at
153-67. We need not now try to account for this problem within Roe itself, however, in order
correctly to decide this case, as we do.
" [Note by the Court.] That is, without any special medical risks in continuing to nurture
the dependent fetal human life willingly conceived within marriage, to the time when it may
be safely delivered to sustain a life outside her womb.
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principle, derived from the Constitution of the United States. We
are quite certain there is no such clause or chilling principle in the
document called our Constitution, nor, indeed, would we be in-
clined to invent one, even supposing it were within our discretion
to do so-as most assuredly it is not. Whatever else "marriage"
may or may not be held to mean, it need not be held to mean so
little as to count for nothing beyond whatever some casual third
party might presume to assert in respect to the pregnancy of a
single person with whom he exchanged no wedding vows.
So might an opinion have been written in declining to upend the Minnesota law.
But consider, next, a state legislature enacting the virtual mirror image of this law,
say, a statute that might read in the following way:
Minn. Civ. Code Sec. 48: "Marriage" shall be deemed, in this
jurisdiction, to confer no interest whatever that one not married
lacks in regard to each woman's reproductive autonomy. Accord-
ingly, no physician providing any abortion service need concern
himself with any alleged interest or concern any husband may
claim to hold in securing the life of the child, it being the policy
of this state that he has none sufficient to count.
How might an opinion from the Supreme Court respond to this development?
As a mere extrapolation of the dicta in Eisenstadt and indeed as in fact declared quite
emphatically in subsequent cases by the Court, the following opinion would provide
a plausible account:
It is startling to think that there could be any constitutional
question raised by this statute, whether of equal protection or of
due process of law. We do not think that there is. To the con-
trary, this act merely reports in statutory form what our own
decisions have already declared to be the controlling law. In our
recent decisions, beginning with Eisenstadt v. Baird, this Court
has held that there is nothing sufficient in marriage to permit a state
to impose any restriction on the right of any woman-whether or
not married and regardless of with whom she conceived a child-
to secure the abortion of any fetus she does not deem worthwhile
to carry to term so long as she acts within the first six months of
conceiving that child.45 This was the essential holding, most
41 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa.
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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recently, in Planned Parenthood ofSoutheastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey,46 a case we explained as but a further elaboration of our
previous decision in Roe v. Wade.47 In brief, in Casey, we have
ourselves declared that not even notice to her husband of her
intention to dispense with the offspring she willingly conceived
with him need be provided if, for any reason satisfactory to her-
self alone, she is not inclined to advise him of her plan.48
The statute before us is therefore not remarkable, much less
objectionable. Rather, it but states a mere truism. That is, it
merely carries particular holdings of ours into suitable provisions
of statutory law. In effect, therefore, it but serves to illuminate
the real meaning of our own decisions on the irrelevance of
marriage in this critical regard. Bluntly stated, and so we have
held, when it comes to determining whether first- or second-term
human life in gestation shall be "terminated," the interest in the
lives of their offspring in gestation stands on no higher footing,
constitutionally speaking, for husbands within marriage than
the interest of those who eschew marriage and have made no
marital commitment at all. Thus a state statute, such as this one,
that advises them that this is so, is merely helpful in clarifying
what we have said about the emptiness of "marriage," so far as
it affects this particular subject, since 1972.
Which of these sets of strikingly different statutes (and very different opinions)
finds the stronger pedigree in the precedents of the Supreme Court? The answer will
not long detain us. The plain answer is that prior to Eisenstadt (and its downstream
abortion-related derivatives), the first opinion would find by far the greater support.
Until that date, virtually every opinion from the Supreme Court dealing with mar-
riage had treated it as special-as a cornerstone of social organization in the United
States, emphasizing its bilateral loyalties, its sheltered community, and its protections
pursuant to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.49 Indeed, the opinion hypothe-
sized for the Court (the imaginary opinion sustaining the first statute) was hardly
more than a mere construction of existing Supreme Court views evolved during a cen-
tury of principal cases touching this field. It is, however, the second opinion-in tone
4 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Ironically, the only provision of the Pennsylvania statute held to
be unconstitutional in Casey, as imposing an "undue burden" on a woman's right to terminate
an unwanted pregnancy, was the provision relating solely to "spousal notification" of her
intention to abort their gestating child. See id. at 893-95.
47 410 U.S. 413 (1973).
48 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 893-95; see also Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52 (1976).
49 See supra notes 6, 12, & 13 and accompanying text.
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as well as in substance-that now more accurately reflects the current constitutional
standing (or lack thereof) of marriage in the decisions of the Supreme Court today.
Indeed, in light of the Court's most recent principal opinion on this particular sub-
ject, o the first opinion would not be consistent with its current view at all. It is only
an opinion of this second sort that would, with rough accuracy, describe the current
state of our constitutional law.
III.
"Marriage" is today easily entered, but then, indeed, it is also almost as easy to
exit.5" So, too, is "marriage" a mere alternative arrangement, one not notably prefer-
able (and, indeed, in some ways less preferable52) than some other arrangements
available in a number of states where, even as in California, mere "Marvin" agree-
ments (private contracts of cohabitation) are legal alternatives to marriage itself.53
Not only has marriage been reduced overall in terms of any legal specialness, rather,
marriage is itself frankly discouraged by some other features of our modem (or post-
modem) law. So, for example, it is commonly supposed that marriage is encouraged
in the structure of the federal income tax (i.e., the advantage of filing ajoint return),
'0 See Casey, 505 U.S. 833.
" The majority of states have long since switched to "no-fault" divorce, and-in keeping
with this switch-decisions to marry may themselves be more lightly made (insofar as they
are virtually cancelable at will). See Doris Jonas Freed & Henry H. Foster, Jr., Divorce in the
Fifty States: An Overview, 14 FAM. L.Q. 229, 241 (1981).
52 A man who marries-and only one who does marry (as distinct from the single, un-
married man)-may become liable for the support of such offspring his wife chooses to bear
adulterously during the marriage, as well as liable also for the support of such offspring she
has with him (and whether he desired them or not). On the other hand, there is no symmetry
in this liability, for the wife is not liable for the support of any children she did not bear-
certainly not for children the husband conceived adulterously with another. For a brief review
of the general topic, see IRA MARK ELLMAN, PAUL M. KURTZ, & KATHARINE T. BARTLETr,
FAMY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 888-97 (2d ed. 1991).
53 See Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976). Such agreements were formerly void
on public policy grounds (akin to contracts of prostitution or meretricious criminal cohabi-
tation). But nonmarital cohabitation is currently not merely lawful in most jurisdictions, rather,
it is on its way to becoming a protected civil right. In California, for example, a private land-
lord's refusal to rent to unmarried cohabitants is actionable in state court. See, e.g., Smith v.
Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996). Following the Supreme
Court's "sodomy decision," in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), moreover, various
state supreme courts have concluded that implicit in the reasoning of the Supreme Court in
Lawrence, unmarried persons have a substantive due process "right" to engage in acts of
fornication and of sodomy, as they desire to pursue indiscriminately, or otherwise. See, e.g.,
Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367, 371 (Va. 2005). In a sense, the Virginia Supreme Court's
decision was also foreshadowed by the Supreme Court's decision in Carey v. Population
Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), which extended a substantive due process right
to buy mail-order nonprescription contraceptive devices to unmarried sixteen-year-olds.
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but even this notion is substantially false. 4 For many couples, marriage comes
accompanied by a tax penalty." Such a couple (a married couple) may pay several
thousand dollars more each year into the federal treasury than had the couple not mar-
ried but stayed single, casually cohabiting, and taking care to file separate returns. 6
Marriage may also be discouraged for the same reason for many among the working
poor as well, for they, too, may likewise be penalized by the federal tax tables such
as they are.57
To be sure, in another country, specifically in Germany, the equivalent tax act of
the national legislature that discriminated in this fashion (subjecting married couples
to higher taxes) was held to be inconsistent with the Constitution's protection of
marriage." But there has been no similar successful challenge entertained by our
Supreme Court, nor could there likely be such a challenge in light of the manner in
which marriage has been diminished in its overall constitutional standing by our
Court. In a larger sense, the second opinion modeled in this brief review simply mani-
fests these trends in the marginalizing of marriage, in the social (dis)organization
of the United States.
Perhaps all of these developments are nonetheless-on balance-progressive
developments, as many evidently believe to be true.59 Perhaps, that is, they are
"good"--that this is truly the way things ought to be where marriage counts very
little (nearly nothing actually) when push comes to shove. Yet, surely there may be
some reason to think this is not entirely so, or at least that these developments have not
come without some costs and, possibly, some real losses as well. As the idea of the
centrality of marriage appears to be on the wane, so, too, may the idea of one's family,
and of one's responsibilities to that family, become diminished as well. The two are
not, after all, entirely easy to distinguish as one tries to think these matters through.'
" See Lawrence Zelenak, Doing Something About Marriage Penalties: A Guide for the
Perplexed, 54 TAx L. REv. 1, 1 (2000).
" See id. at 8.
56 See Tom Herman, A Special Summary and Forecast of Federal and State Tax
Developments, WALL ST. J., July 28, 1993, at Al (reporting that even in 1994, it could readily
cost a given professional married couple $6,300 each year, as a surtax purely on their marriage).
" See Editorial, Review & Outlook: Home Clintonomix, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 1993, at
A10 (reporting that under the then current proposed tax bill: "[A] couple earning $12,000
each and planning three kids... [will] pay $2,744 in taxes if they get married, but collect
refunds totaling $831 if they stay single.").
58 In Germany, where marriage is expressly protected in the Basic Law, supra note 2,the
Constitutional Court has struck down tax provisions putting those who marry at a tax rate
disadvantage ofthe kind reflected in our own current tax laws. See, e.g., BverfGE, 6,55 (1957),
translated and reprinted in WALTER F. MURPHY & JOSEPH TANENHAUS, COMPARATIVE
CoNsTITUTIoNAL LAW 339, 339-42 (1977).
" See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624
(1980).
' So, for example, in a widely reported article appearing a decade ago in The Atlantic,
author Barbara Whitehead noted these disquieting facts:
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Finally, however, even as acknowledged at the beginning of this brief essay, it
is true that the Constitution itself does not expressly address "marriage," "family,"
or "children" at all.6 So perhaps it is altogether pointless to presume to relate any
of these things to developments in constitutional law, as I have sought to relate them
here. Yet, admitting all of this, it is difficult to believe that they are wholly discon-
nected insofar as the Supreme Court itself has actively participated in this cultural
debate, first by specially treating these interests with solicitude and exceptional pro-
tection, but more recently with an attitude of quite a different and dismissive sort.
Whatever one may think of this development, moreover, and whether one believes
that the Supreme Court merely reflects public attitudes in its various constitutional
decisions (as many critics think) or sometimes acts in ways that may also influence
public attitudes in its various cases interpreting and applying the Constitution (as cer-
tainly seems likely), it surely does seem that we do find ourselves in quite an altered
state. If even this much is true, then perhaps, however, even now we should also
think a little more seriously than the Court itself has seemed to do, or than we have
shown sufficient inclination to do, as we slip away now to see ourselves as "through
a glass, [but] darkly," rather than as we might want to be seen, "face to face."62
Survey after survey shows that Americans are less inclined than
they were a generation ago to value sexual fidelity, lifelong marriage,
and parenthood as worthwhile personal goals. [The out-of-wedlock
birth rate went from five percent in 1960 to 27 percent in 1990] ....
Fewer than half of all adult Americans today regard the idea of sacrifice
for others as a positive moral virtue.... More than half of the increase
in child poverty in the 1980s is attributable to changes in family struc-
ture .... In fact, if family structure in the United States had remained
relatively constant since 1960, the rate of child poverty would be a third
lower than it is today.
Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, Dan Quayle Was Right, THE ATLANTIC, Apr. 1993, at 50, 55, 58
& 77. And from 27 percent in 1990 (up from five percent in 1960), as reported by Barbara
Whitehead, the out-of-wedlock birthrate has leaped another 10 percent, to 37 percent overall,
by 2005. See Joyce A. Martin, et. al., Births: Final Data Per 2005, 56 NAT'L VrrAL STATS.
RPTS. No. 6, Dec. 5, 2007, at tbl. 20. In brief, between 1960 and 2005, less than a half-century,
the percentage of out-of-wedlock births increased sevenfold! See also Glendon, supra note 27.
6 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. Though, to be sure, it does address "equal
protection," see U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV, a concept quite left behind in the Court's
remarkably degraded treatment of a husband's interest in the life of a gestating child willingly
conceived within marriage and posing no undue burden to the woman when she seeks its
termination without regard to why .... See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 887-98 (1992).
62 See 1 Corinthians 13:12 (King James) ("For now we see through a glass, darkly; but
then face to face ....").
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